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CASENOTE
Determining what is in the Public
Welfare in Water Appropriations and
Transfers: The Intel Example
I. INTRODUCTION
In the arid western United States, economic development
depends on control over water. Historically, water was valued in the
West predominantly for mining, manufacturing, irrigated agriculture,
domestic uses and hydropower generation.1 Around the turn of the
century, western states, led by Wyoming, began to adopt permit statutes
with public welfare clauses. Early case law shaping the public interest
criterion has typically treated public interest as synonymous with
economic development.3 In recent decades, concerns about public values
such as recreation, scenic beauty, and fish and wildlife habitat have
grown.4 Western states have responded to these concerns in a variety of
ways, including reservation of minimum stream flows, instream
protection,5 and public welfare legislation for water rights allocations and
transfers." Today, most western states feature statutes mandating public
interest review of new appropriations7 and several mandate public
1. Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the
West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1987).
2. Id. at 685.
3. See, e.g., Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910); Cookingham v.
Lewis, 114 P. 88 (Or. 1911), reh'g denied, 115 P. 32 (Or. 1911); In re Commonwealth Power
Co., 143 N.W. 937 (Neb. 1913).
4. See Grant, supra note 1, at 688.
5. See Richard Ausness, Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of
Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407 (1986).
6. The terms public interest and public welfare are interchangeable for purposes of
this discussion. Where cases and statutes specifically use one term or the other, this Note
reflects that terminology.
7. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(a) (Michie 1962 & Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-153(A) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995-96); CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (West 1971 & Supp,
1995); IDAHO CODE § 42-203A(5)(e) (Michie 1948 & Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-711
(1989 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(4)(b)(iii) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
46-234(2), 235(2)(a)(iii), (1993 & Supp. 1994); NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.370(3) (1986 & Supp.
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-1, 6, 7, 72-12-3(E) (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 61-04-06 (Michie 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170 (Butterworh 1987); S.D.
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interest review for water transfers.$
Under traditional appropriative law, water rights holders were
granted water in the order that applications were made, and up to the
amount of water available in a water course ("first in time, first in
right").9 As long as water was appropriated for a beneficial use," no
consideration was given to which use was a better use in considering
applications for water rights." New Mexico's water code, adopted in
1907, was amended in 1985 to require consideration of the public welfare
in water transfers and new appropriations. The legislature did not
define public welfare. Public welfare is currently determined in an ad hoc
fashion by state water officials, or ruled on by the courts on a case by
case basis.
When preparing for hearings before the State Engineer, parties
applying for new appropriations or transfers of water have no guidance
on which public welfare arguments the State Engineer will consider and
how he will weigh them. A lack of standards may lead to increased
numbers of appeals. The courts are ill equipped to make public welfare
determinations which are essentially political in nature. Thus, definition
of public welfare is needed.
This Note examines how the New Mexico State Engineer deals
with the public welfare criterion in the State water code by focusing on
the recent decision by the State Engineer to grant an application for
appropriation of groundwater by Intel Corporation. The Note first briefly
examines the history of public welfare criteria in western states and in
New Mexico and traces the development of specific statutory criteria in
western water law. It next discusses the development of public welfare
in New Mexico's water law. The Note then analyzes the 1994 decision of
the New Mexico State Engineer to grant Intel Corporation's permit
application to pump 4,500 acre feet per year of groundwater. Specifically,
CODIFIED LAWS § 46-2A-9 (Michie Rev. 1987 & Supp. 1995); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §
11.134(3)(c) (Vernon's 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1) (Michie 1953 & Supp. 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290 (West 1992 Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 41-4-503 (Michie
1995). The two states without public interest review statutes are Oklahoma and Colorado.
See CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-82-101 et seq. (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
82-105 et seq. (West 1990 & Supp. 1995-6).
8. These states are: Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and
North Dakota.
9. Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water
Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURcES J. 347,
349 (1989).
10. N.M. CONST. ART. XVI, § 3: "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the
limit of the right to use of water".
11. Johnson & DuMars, supra note 9, at 356.
12. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-51, 72-5-6, 72-5-7, 72-5-23, 72-5-24, 72-12-7 (RepI. Pamp.
1985).
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the Note examines the public welfare arguments made by the applicant
Intel Corporation, the Protestant Village of Corrales, and the treatment by
the State Engineer of public welfare in his decision to grant the permit
application. Finally, the Note argues that public welfare decisions should
not be made in an ad hoc fashion. It examines the strengths and
weaknesses of several solutions to defining public welfare, concludes that
the legislature, in cooperation with citizen advisory boards, should define
the public welfare criterion in the New Mexico water code, and in
Appendix A proposes public welfare factors which should be included
in public welfare legislation.
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE
Early case law in western states equated public interest with
economic development. 3 Projects which had the potential of scaring
away investors or impeding economic development were considered
detrimental to the public interest. In 1910, the New Mexico Territorial
Supreme court, in Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, said that it would not
be in the public interest to grant a permit to a large irrigation project if
there existed a possibility that the water supply was inadequate, because
project failure would discourage potential investors from considering
investment in future irrigation projects. 4 The court also held that larger
irrigation projects were to be favored over smaller ones.'5
In In re Commonwealth Power Co., 6 the Nebraska Supreme Court
upheld the state water agency's rejection of the second of two competing
permit applications for generation of hydroelectric power." The court
reasoned that if permits were granted for conflicting projects, the
resulting interference and litigation would discourage potential future
investors. 8 A few years later, in Big Horn Power Co. v. State of
Wyoming, 9 the state engineer in Wyoming in an unappealed decision
determined that a proposed dam exceeding thirty-five feet in height,
would harm the public interest. The area had great potential for mineral
development and the proposed dam would have interfered with the only
13. See Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045; In re Comnonwealth Power, 143 N.W. 937; Big Horn
Power Co. v. State of Wyoming, 148 P. 1110 (Wyo. 1915).
14. Hinderlider, 110 P. at 1057. There, the court said that "the failure of any irrigation
project carries with it not only disastrous consequences to its owners and to the farmers
who are depending on it, but besides tends to destroy faith in irrigation projects generally."
Id.
15. Id. at 1056-57.
16. 143 N.W. 937 (1913).
17. Id. at 939.
18. Id. at 938-39.
19. 148 P. 1110 (Wyo. 1915).
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economically viable railroad in the area." Although the lower dam
produced less power, the state engineer determined that power for
mineral development could be generated elsewhere.
In the early part of the century, courts and agencies gave no
consideration to public values like scenic beauty, recreational uses, fish
and wildlife habitat.2' A notable exception was a 1929 Oregon law that
required the State Reclamation Commission, when considering the public
interest in new appropriations, to include the impacts on public
recreation and commercial and game fishing. ' By the mid-1960s, a
transition from purely economic interpretations of public welfare to
increased consideration of other public values began to emerge. 2 In
1966, the Alaska legislature enacted a water use act which, unlike other
public interest statutes, comprehensively enumerated public welfare
factors, including economics, fish and game, public health, public
recreation, harm to other persons and loss of alternate uses of water.24
Under modern appropriative law, most states require
consideration of public welfare criteria as part of the permitting process
and in determining whether to grant applications for water transfers.
Thus, today, only two of the eighteen western states have failed to enact
statutes mandating public welfare review of new appropriations.2
Although public welfare review of water transfers has been less widely
accepted, it is rapidly gaining acceptance.' Modem public interest
statutes feature a wide variety of public welfare factors, ranging from
groundwater recharge,' fish and wildlife habitat and scenic resource
20. Id. at 1114-15.
21. Grant, supra note 1, at 688.
22. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 245, § 1, 1929 Or. Laws 252-53. The currently amended
version is at OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(5) (1987).
23. Grant, supra note 1, at 688.
24. AIASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b) (1962 & Supp. 1995) reads as follows:
In determining the public interest, the commissioner shall consider
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(2) the effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(3) the effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational opportunities;
(4) the effect on public health;
(5) the effect of losses of alternate uses of water that might be made within a reasonable
time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed appropriations;
(6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed appropriations;
(7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the appropriation; and
(8) the effect upon access to navigable or public waters.
25. See supra, note 7.
26. Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and North Dakota
currently have statutes requiring public interest review of water rights transfers. See supra,
note 7.
27. ARZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-801.01-898.01 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995).
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preservation ' to instream flow, aesthetic and recreational concerns.29
The statutes vary broadly, however, in the amount of guidance they
afford to state water officials regarding what factors must be considered.
III. PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW MEXICO WATER LAW
New Mexico's water code, adopted in 1907, gave the Territorial
Engineer the authority to deny an application for an appropriation if it
was contrary to the public interest?' The only case which interprets the
"contrary to the public interest" language is Hinderlider.3' Since the early
part of the century, the state's population has increased approximately
fivefold, surface waters have become overappropriated and water is
increasingly mined from groundwater.32 Interstate stream compacts and
Indian water rights impose additional constraints.' In 1985, the New
Mexico legislature amended several water statutes. Transfers of water
rights became subject to the public welfare requirement.' The law now
also requires the State Engineer, when ruling on applications to
appropriate groundwater, to consider the public interest. ' Thus, the
State Engineer must determine that there is unappropriated water
available, that the proposed use will not impair existing water rights and
is not contrary to conservation of water within the state or detrimental to
the public welfare of the state. ' However, the New Mexico legislature
has not defined "public welfare." It is currently left to state water officials
and the courts to define public welfare criteria on a case by case basis.
There is little New Mexico case law dealing with the public welfare
criterion. Hinderlider held that "public interest" should be construed more
broadly than public health or safety matters. The court said that "the fact
that the entire statute is designed to secure the greatest possible benefit
from [public waters] for the public, should be borne in mind."37 But the
Hinderlider holding focuses entirely on economic factors. In re Application
28. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1243, 1243.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1995).
29. IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1995).
30. 1907 N.M. Laws, ch. 49, § 28.
31. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910).
32. Consuelo Bokum, Options for Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in
New Mexico's Water Code 1-2 (Oct. 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
33. Id. at 2.
34. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-23, 72-5-24 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1985) (surface water);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-7 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1985) (ground water).
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3() (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1985).
36. Id.
37. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1056 (N.M. 1910).
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of Sleeper, a case dealing with transfer of surface water, illustrates the
movement away from maximum economic development as the primary
public interest value.
In the Sleeper case, the New Mexico district court and appellate
court" disagreed on the public welfare criterion in a case of first
impression in New Mexico. Economic values associated with a new ski
resort development were pitted directly against the traditional cultural
values of a small farming community in northern New Mexico.* Tierra
Grande Corporation began developing a subdivision in conjunction with
a large ski resort development near Ensenada in northern New Mexico."1
The corporation dug a gravel pit while building roads for the subdivision
and subsequently transformed the pit into a recreational lake by
damming the Nutrias Creek, in violation of state water law.42 The
Nutrias is a tributary of the Rio Brazos and empties into the Ensenada
Ditch before joining the Rio Brazos. Members of the Ensenada Land and
Water Association use the creek's water, which consists mainly of snow
melt and is rich in silt, to "fertilize" their land.3
The state engineer forced Tierra Grande Corporation to breach
the dam.' Subsequently, the corporation purchased two tracts of land
and appurtenant water rights from local property owners in the Ensenada
area.* The purchases were conditional upon the state engineer's
approval of the transfer application.' The initial one-time diversion to
fill the lake and subsequent annual diversions to compensate for
evaporation losses necessarily would have resulted in retirement of
agricultural land.4' The Association protested the transfer, alleging that
it would impair existing rights and would be contrary to the public
interest.
4
G
In the district court, the Ensenada Association argued that
approval of the application would be contrary to the public interest
38. Sleeper v. Reynolds, No. RA 84-53(C), (N.M. Dist. Ct. Apr. 16, 1985) [hereinafter
Sleeper 11, rev'd, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), cert. quashed, 759 P.2d 200 (N.M. 1988).
For a detailed discussion of the Sleeper case, see Shannon A. Parden, Note, The Milagro
Beanfield War Revisited in Ensenada Land and Water Association v. Sleeper: Public Welfare Defies
Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RsouRcEs J. 861 (1989).
39. Sleeper v. Ensenada Land and Water Ass'n, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)
[hereinafter Sleeper I/].
40. Sleeper I, slip op. at 2.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Sleeper II, 760 P.2d at 789.
48. Sleeper I, slip op. at 6-8.
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because it would retire agricultural land from cultivation."9 When a
member of a ditch association sells his land and transfers his water rights,
ditch maintenance expenses must be borne by fewer people than before.
Consequently, a heavier financial burden is placed on remaining
individual Association members.' Tierra Grande Corporation argued
that the proposed project would increase economic development and
stimulate the local economy and would therefore be in the public
interest.s'
The district court squarely addressed the conflicting public
welfare values. Judge Encinias stated that northern New Mexicans
possessed a significant history, traditions and culture of recognized value.
The people of northern New Mexico were deeply rooted to the land and
water was central to their cultural identity.' He noted that the proposed
development would only create menial jobs for the local population and
dismissed the corporation's assertion that greater economic benefits were
more desirable than the preservation of cultural identity.' The judge
said that to transfer water rights, devoted for more than a century to
agricultural purposes, in order to "construct a playground for those who
can pay," ' would be a poor trade.
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the
statute in effect at the time of the application precluded the state engineer
from considering broad public interest factors in the transfer of surface
water.'5 Therefore, the court reversed, but without reaching the critical
question of how to interpret conflicting public welfare values. Section
72-5-23 of the New Mexico water code was subsequently amended and
now requires the State Engineer to consider the public welfare in an
application for change of use.' Meanwhile, Judge Encinias' holding does
not constitute binding precedent and the meaning of "public welfare" in
the New Mexico Water Code remains unsettled.
Sleeper I appears to have carried forward the view of the Supreme
Court of Idaho that public interest review should take into consideration
any local public interest affected by a proposed appropriation.57 The
Sleeper case illustrates the problems associated with weighing conflicting
public values. On the one side of the equation are the powerful economic
49. Id.
50. Parden, supra note 38, at 864.
51. Id. at 865.
52. Sleeper I, slip op. at 5-6.
53. Id. at 8.
54. Parden, supra note 38, at 865-66.
55. Sleeper II, 760 P.2d at 791.
56. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1985).
57. See Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
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interests of a corporation whose public welfare arguments are easily
quantifiable in generated jobs and primary and secondary economic
activity. On the other side are aesthetic, cultural and community values
which are far less tangible or easily quantifiable. More generally, the
clash exists between private individuals' vested property interests in the
free alienability of water rights on one side' and public values such as
environment, fish and wildlife, instream flows, and recreational values
related to the enjoyment of nature, or local public values such as the
cohesion of a local ditch association and a traditional way of life on the
other. The district court in Sleeper I, in weighing competing values,
forcefully rejected a pure economic analysis of public welfare." The
decision raises difficult questions. How did Judge Encinias arrive at his
decision? Is it paternalistic? The poverty-stricken local population may
have preferred to earn a living wage in a ski resort rather than eking out
a meager existence farming the land. How should competing factors be
weighed? Who is to decide between competing values? The courts? The
state engineer? The legislature?
After the trial court's decision in Sleeper I, the local county
commission adopted land use regulations intended to "protect the unique
culture" in the county which stated that the "transfer of water rights from
traditional uses to residential subdivision or commercial uses, will
generally not promote the public welfare. " ' ° This raises a related
question: At what level of government should policy decisions such as
the public welfare decisions be made? At the local (county commission)
or the state level (legislature, state engineer)? The county commission's
decision, though embodying democratic accountability and local control,
lacks geographic breadth and allows for admission of few outside
interests.6' Thus, a more fundamental question in defining public
welfare is: whose interests will be served?' The following section
discusses how other western states have grappled with the issue of public
welfare.
58. See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 9, at 351. An appropriative water right, once
vested, is a constitutionally protected property interest. It can be sold, leased, or transferred.
This protection came about out of the necessity to promote investment of capital and protect
the stability of long-term financial arrangements of economic development which depended
on water.
59. Sleeper I, slip op. at 7-9.
60. Rio Arriba County Land Subdivision Regulations, 1 WATER MARKET UPDATE 1, 9-10
(1987), cited in Grant, supra note 1, at 701.
61. See Grant, supra note 1, at 701.
62. Id. at 701-02, citing Schmidt, COMMENTARY IN WESTERN WATER RESOURCES: COMING
PROBLEMS AND THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES, 221-222 (M. Duncan ed., 1980): "[W]e can't say
that one decision-making system is better, more efficient, or more equitable... without first
asking whose interests we want to serve. . ." Id.
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IV. PUBLIC WELFARE IN THE WESTERN STATES
Modem public interest review statutes afford varying degrees of
guidance to administrative officials. Some statutes comprehensively
define the public interest and include public values. The Alaska water use
act is an example of such a statute. 3 Some statutes do not define the
public interest as comprehensively as the Alaska statute but still give
significant guidance. For example, the Utah permit statute for new
appropriations requires consideration of the proposed appropriation's
impact on public recreation or the natural stream environment."
Another example is several California statutes for new appropriations
which require consideration of the state water plan and the relative
benefit from various beneficial uses of the water, including, among
others, preservation and enhancement of fish, wildlife and recreation, and
streamflows.' Other permit statutes provide little or no guidance for
public interest review. The permit statutes of Nevada," New Mexico,67
and Utah' are examples of such statutes.
Permit statutes which fail to provide specific guidance for public
welfare review are subject to statutory interpretation by state water
officials and by the courts. Two cases have grappled with this problem
by relying on recently enacted and related legislation in arriving at their
statutory interpretation." In 1973, in Stempel v. Department of Water
Resources,' the Washington Supreme court rejected the Department's
arguments that it need not consider the effects of a proposed
appropriation on water quality because other state agencies already had
authority to regulate pollution and because the statutory public welfare
requirement, dating back to 1917, was unrelated to pollution concerns.'
The court found legislative guidance in the Water Resources Act,'
which declared a policy of preserving and enhancing natural resources,
63. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b). Other examples of public interest statutes which
comprehensively define public welfare include N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-4-06 (1985) and OR.
REv. STAT. § 537.170(5) (1985).
64. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (Michie 1953 & Supp. 1995). Other examples include CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 1256-58 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (Supp.
1986).
65. CAL WATER CODE §§ 1256-1258 (West 1971 & Supp. 1995).
66. NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.370(3) (1986 & Supp. 1993).
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-5.1,-6, -7, -23, 72-12-3, 72-12-7 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1985).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1) (Michie 1953 & Supp. 1995).
69. Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 508 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1973); Shokal v.
Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
70. Stempel, 508 P.2d 166.
71. Id. at 172.
72. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.54.010-.920 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
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aesthetic values and public health. In addition, the court found that the
State Environmental Policy Act of 197173 required state agencies to
prepare environmental impact statements for major actions significantly
affecting the quality of the environment. The court concluded that the
department had an obligation, in light of these Acts, to consider the water
quality effects of proposed appropriations.74
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Shokal v. Dunn' looked to
minimum streamflow legislation to interpret an appropriations provision
in the water code. The court found it persuasive that the streamflow
statute, designed to protect "fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life,
recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation values, and
water quality,"' was passed on the same day that the legislature added
the term "public interest" to the appropriations provision. Under that
provision, the state water official could reject an application for
appropriation of water if the applicant's appropriation would conflict
with the local public interest. Local public interest is defined as the affairs
of the people in the area directly affected by the proposed use.' Thus,
the court concluded that the legislature must have intended the public
interest on the local scale to include the elements listed in the minimum
stream provision and "any locally important factor impacted by proposed
appropriations. "' This far-reaching decision empowers local
communities in Idaho to assert any locally relevant public welfare factor
in applications for water appropriation.
Absent such guidance in the form of recently enacted and related
legislation which prescribes consideration of public welfare factors such
as preservation and enhancement of natural resources, aesthetic values,
and recreation, courts have difficulty mandating consideration of broad
public welfare values beyond economic development.' In response to
these concerns, most western states have defined public welfare to some
degree.
V. THREE APPROACHES TO DEFINING PUBLIC WELFARE
There appear to be three different approaches to defining public
welfare. One approach is to adopt lists of welfare uses, either
73. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.010-.910 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
74. Stempel, 508 P.2d. at 171-72.
75. 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
76. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 448, citing IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (Supp. 1986).
77. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 448, citing IDAHO CODE § 42-1501.
78. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 449.
79. See Grant, supra note 1, at 690-91.
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legislatively' or judicially."s  Examples of factors that states have
included in their public welfare lists include:u
- harm to other persons, losses of alternative uses of water
(Alaska); '
- public health (Alaska);"
- groundwater recharge (Arizona); '
- recreation, and preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife
resources (California);"
- aquatic life, aesthetic beauty, water quality, assuring minimum
stream flows, discouraging waste and encouraging conservation
(Idaho); 7
instream flow (Nebraska);8'
- flood control (Oregon);" and
- natural resources, public health (Washington).'
Statutes that list welfare criteria are helpful because they provide
greater certainty for permit applicants and parties protesting the
applications in preparing their cases before a state water official. They
have, however, been criticized because they offer little help for state
water officials in weighing the relative merits of criteria. 91
A second approach is for the legislature to prescribe, through
preference statutes, how various public welfare factors should be
weighed. 2 Some states have statutes preferring irrigation to recreation
or domestic over agricultural uses. For example, a Texas statute states
that domestic and municipal uses, including water for sustaining human
life and the life of domestic animals, are superior to other purposes."
80. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 46.15,080 (1962 & Supp. 1995).
81. See Shakal, 707 P.2d at 448-49. There, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
elements listed in the Alaska statute (§ 46.5.080(b)) must be considered part of the local
public interest. It further held that assuring minimum stream flows, discouraging waste, and
encouraging conservation should also be considered.
82. See generally NEW MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, LIVING WITHIN OUR
MEANS: A WATER MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR NEW MEXICO IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1992),
83. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 46.15,080(b) (1985).
84. Id.
85. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.801.01 to 898.01 (Supp. 1995).
86. CALIF. WATER CODE §§ 1243, 1243.5 (West 1962 & Supp. 1995).
87. IDAHO CODE § 42-1501 (Michie 1948 & Supp. 1995).
88. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,107 (1993), § 46-2,111 (Supp. 1995).
89. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(5) (Butterworth 1987).
90. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
91. Grant, supra note 1, at 708-09.
92. Id. at 710.
93. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Supp. 1987). Another example is a provision in
the California Water Code: "It is hereby declared to be the established policy of this State
that the use of water for domestic purposes is the highest use of water and that the next
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Most western states currently do not prioritize public welfare factors.'
A precise definition of a hierarchy of public welfare values is probably
undesirable. What is appropriate for one geographic area of the state may
not be appropriate for another. Preference statutes would have the effect
of constraining water appropriations and transfer decisions instead of
allowing the flexibility necessary to accommodate regional and temporal
differences and changes and to allow optimal use of the available water
resources. Thus, they would not be good public policy.
A third approach to making public welfare decisions is the
approach taken by the New Mexico legislature: to simply state that the
public welfare must be taken into consideration. Public welfare decisions
are made in an ad hoc fashion. Thus, parties applying for an
appropriation or transfer of water must argue their case without any
certainty about what to expect, which criteria will be considered or how
much weight will be accorded to each criterion." In addition, courts
have no guidance by which to judge the State Engineer's treatment of
public welfare. Related to this concern is an issue of administrative
law . ' The nondelegation doctrine9' limits legislatures' ability to
delegate broad powers to administrative agencies. Thus, it may be
unconstitutional to write public welfare statutes without some form of
direction to the state water official on what factors he must consider.
Under current New Mexico law, the State Engineer has no standards to
guide his discretionary power and the courts have no guidance to decide
whether the agency overstepped the bounds of its delegated authority.
The Intel decision" poignantly demonstrates this lack of
highest use is for irrigation." CAL WATER CODE § 106 (West 1971 & Supp. 1995).
94. But the North Dakota water code, for example, contains the following preference
statute:
"When there are competing applications for water from the same source,
and the source is insufficient to supply all applicants, the state engineer
shall adhere to the following order of priority: (1) Domestic use; (2)
Municipal use; (3) Livestock use; (4) Irrigation use; (5) Industrial use; (6)
Fish, wildlife, and other outdoor recreation."
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 61-04-06.1 (Michie 1995).
95. See generally Charles T. DuMars & Michelle Minnis, New Mexico Water Law:
Determining Public Welfare Values in Water Rights Allocation, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 817 (1989).
96. See Grant, supra note 1, at 693.
97. The nondelegation doctrine limits the ability of the legislative branch to delegate
powers to-an executive agency because the delegation may offend the separation of powers
doctrine. To ensure that the power is essentially retained in the legislature, delegated
powers must not be broad but must be limited by standards to guide the agency and to
allow courts to determine whether standards have been followed. See, e.g., Touby v. United
States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
98. In Re the Applications of Intel Corporation to Appropriate the Underground Waters
of the State of New Mexico in the Rio Grande Underground Water Basin, No. RG-57125,
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standards for interpreting the public welfare criterion in New Mexico
water law. The State Engineer, uncomfortable with making policy
decisions, equated beneficial use with public welfare. The unfortunate
result is that the legislature's mandate to consider public welfare
separately from beneficial use was simply ignored.
VI. THE INTEL DECISION
On April 1, 1993, the New Mexico media announced the one
billion dollar expansion by Intel for the Rio Rancho, New Mexico facility.
Intel's water use before the expansion was between two to three million
gallons a day. After the expansion, water use is expected to increase to
as much as 10 million gallons a day.9 Its consumptive use is estimated
to be between five and thirteen percent of its permitted amount.'0'
Intel applied to the New Mexico State Engineer for permits to
drill three wells from which Intel would pump 4,500 acre feet per year
("AFY") or 1.5 billion gallons a year."°  The Village of Corrales
("Corrales'), which is entirely dependent on domestic wells for its water,
feared that their domestic wells would experience drawdowns and
protested the application. 3 A hearing before the State Engineer
followed in April, 1994. The State Engineer subsequently granted Intel's
application.' 4
RG-57125-S and RG-57125-S-2 (June 10, 1994) (Findings and Order) [hereinafter State
Engineer Findings and Order).
99. Id. at 3. However, Intel proposed to implement water conservation measures to
reduce its total average water demand by between 1,430,000 gallons per day in January 1995
to 4,080,000 gallons per day in 1999, resulting in a per-day demand of 5,680,000 in January
1995 to 6,320,000 in January 1999. Thus, Intel estimated a reduction in its average total site
water demand between 20.1% in 1995 and 39.2% in 1999. Id. at 4-5. The State Engineer
retained jurisdiction over the permit until 1999 to monitor Intel's progress on the proposed
water conservation measures. Id. at 15-16.
100. State Engineer Findings and Order, supra note 98, at 8.
101. An acre foot is the amount of water it takes to flood one acre a foot deep.
102. Intel Permit Applications Nos. RG-57125, RG-57125-S, and RG-57125-S-2.
103. Memorandum Brief in Support of Findings and Order for the Village of Corrales,
In Re the Applications of Intel Corporation to Appropriate the Underground Waters of the
State of New Mexico in the Rio Grande Underground Water Basin, No. RG-57125,
RG-57125-S and RG-57125-S-2 (June 10, 1994) [hereinafter Corrales Memorandum Brief .
104. The State Engineer granted Intel an appropriation of 3,248.6 AFY, to be drawn from
all three wells combined, instead of the 4,500 AFY Intel applied for. The State Engineer
imposed the condition that the applicant install well monitoring systems in the Corrales area
to monitor groundwater effects from Intel's wells for a period of three years from the first
date of diversion of water resulting from the permit. The State Engineer further retained
jurisdiction to evaluate the effects on the shallow wells in Corrales after three years of
pumpage. Finally, the State Engineer retained jurisdiction over the permit to evaluate,
through January 1999, the progress made by Intel on its water conservation programs. State
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Public Welfare Criteria Addressed
1. Arguments of the Village of Corrales
Corrales strongly opposed the Intel expansion. At the heart of its
public welfare discussion was the argument that the public welfare
impacts of Intel's application must be evaluated in light of the broad
public welfare concerns of the local communities in the vicinity of Intel's
proposed pumping."s The Village urged that public welfare criteria
should not be strictly confined to economic benefits. Citing two New
Mexico district court cases, Sleeper P' and Anaya, 7 Corrales argued
that public welfare should not be treated as synonymous with the
economic benefits to Intel and the economic gain to the State of New
Mexico. In both decisions, the court held that the public interest
comprehends more than economic values and includes cultural, historical,
and aesthetic values. Corrales also urged the State Engineer to look to the
statutes and case law of Idaho, which consider "local public interest," and
reject the application if "the affairs of the people in the area [are] directly
affected by the proposed use." "°r
Corrales voiced a number of local public concerns. An expert for
Corrales testified that 7,500 of its residents depend entirely on individual
domestic wells for their water supply." Corrales has an estimated 2,728
domestic wells, a majority of which are located in close proximity to the
proposed Intel well sites. The wells are typically shallow. Intels wells
could draw down the water level to below the suction limit of the pumps
on the domestic wells. Corrales argued that one foot draw-down, caused
by Intel's pumping, could cause up to 50 percent of the domestic wells
located east of the Corrales main canal to require drilling to a depth of
150 feet and be equipped with submersible pumps. The total cost of
replacing 50 percent of these wells at an average of $3,500 per well would
amount to $3,500,000 in costs to the residents of Corrales Village. If the
wells needed to be drilled deeper, to 250 feet, the total cost would be
Engineer Findings and Order, supra note 98, at 13-16.
105. Corrales Memorandum Brief, supra note 103, at 12-18.
106. Sleeper v. Reynolds, No. RA 84-53(C), (N.M. Dist. Ct. Apr. 16, 1985) [hereinafter
Sleeper 11, rev'd, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), cert. quashed, 759 P.2d 200 (N.M. 1988).
107. Anaya v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, No. 43,347 (N.M. First Jud. Dist. June
22, 1990), cited in Corrales Memorandum Brief, supra note 103, at 13. The court held that
ditch users with provisionally determined priority dates earlier than that of the utility had
the better right. Discussing public welfare considerations, the court said: "The interest of the
public does not only comprehend economic values but cultural, historical and aesthetic
values."
108. Corrales Memorandum Brief, supra note 103, at 13.
109. Id. at 16.
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$5,700,000. If the proportion of wells drilled to 150 feet and 250 feet depth
were roughly equal, the total cost would be $4,689,000."' Thus,
granting Intel's application would not be in the public welfare of
Corrales.
In addition, Corrales argued that the Intel expansion would have
adverse effects on air quality, put stress on the Village infrastructure from
increased traffic and waste water disposal, and generally diminish the
quality of life for the Corrales residents."' While not disputing that the
Intel expansion would result in economic benefits, however difficult to
quantify, Corrales questioned the magnitude of the promised benefits to
the State. It argued that there would be impacts on local infrastructure
and societal and environmental values which Intel chose not to quantify.
It cited a report"' which stated that "the total cost to the taxpayers of
the State is $250 million in direct tax abatement and subsidies in the first
five years alone. This translates to $250,000 per job based on 1,000 jobs to
be created."" 3 Thus, Corrales argued, the cost of the Intel expansion
might far outweigh the benefits to the community."4 Corrales argued
that Intel had an obligation to present a balanced analysis of public costs
as well as public benefits resulting from Intel's expansion and attendant
use of the public's water. Thus, Corrales urged that Intel's application
should not be approved until a complete benefit-cost analysis was
performed by Intel, or alternatively, that the State Engineer retain
continued jurisdiction over Intel's permit in case pumping resulted in
detrimental consequences to the public welfare of the local
community."5 While Corrales' public welfare arguments centered on the
local public interest of the citizens of Corrales Village, Intel's arguments
were predominantly of an economic nature.
2. Intel's Public Welfare Arguments
Intel made three public welfare arguments."6 First, it argued
that it would hire 2,400 more employees in New Mexico because of its
110. Id. at 18.
111. Id. at 16.
112. SOUTHWEST ORGANIZING PROJECT, INTEL INSIDE NEW MEXIco 31 (May 3,1994). The
report can be obtained from Southwest Organizing Project in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
113. Id. at 31.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 18.
116. Intel Corporations's [sic] Findings of Facts, and Conclusions of Law at 13, In Re the
Applications of Intel Corporation to Appropriate the Underground Waters of the State of
New Mexico in the Rio Grande Underground Water Basin, No. RG-57125, RG-57125-S and
RG-57125-S-2 (June 10, 1994) [hereinafter Intel Findings and Conclusions].
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expansion."1 The expansion would generate net state and local benefits
of over $24 million in the first two years of production."8 In addition,
it would generate approximately $3 billion in indirect economic activity
in the first two years through increased third-party economic activity." 9
Second, Intel contended that the economic benefits brought to the
State would create substantial social benefits including increased
educational opportunities, improved security, recreational benefits and
other social benefits which come from increased economic opportunities.
It further argued that it provides social gains through the benefits
program it makes available to its employees, including higher than
average salaries, a corporate culture which encourages substantial
responsibility and growth opportunities in the workplace, health
coverage, training, education, employee sabbaticals, and stock
options.'n Intel also argued that it makes monetary, technical, and
other contributions to the community, including supporting the TVI
(Albuquerque Technical Vocational Institute)' campus at its Rio
Rancho Facility, assisting and supporting science curricula and programs
at schools, and donating computers to schools."
Finally, Intel argued that it has paid substantial sums to cover
infrastructure costs, including contributions to cover the costs of an
additional sewer line and sewage treatment plant capacity." It argued
that it has spent money to abate odors in response to complaints by
Corrales residents." Citing traffic studies, it disputed that its expansion
would result in increased traffic on Corrales Road." Since it would
not obtain water rights to offset the impacts of its pumping on the Rio
Grande from any acequias, there would be no adverse impacts on
members of community acequias 6 Furthermore, Intel's pumping
would have no negative impact on the cottonwoods or willows in the
Bosque.2 7 Lastly, Intels expert predicted that drawdowns in Corrales
domestic wells would be minimal." Intel argued that water levels in
the wells are declining now because of pumping by the City of
Albuquerque and Rio Rancho Utility Corporation (RRUC), and that in
117. Id. at 13.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120, Id. at 13-14.
121. TVI is a Community College in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
122. Intel Findings and Conclusions, supra note 117, at 14.
123. Id. at 15.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 14.
128. Id. at 6.
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any case domestic wells need to be redrilled periodically because of a
deepening of the water level and normal deterioration of the wells. Intel
predicted that within 40 years, only 25 wells would have an insufficient
water column as a result of granting Intels permit applications."2
Excluding from the total number of wells those which would need to be
replaced because of natural deterioration, between four and eight wells
would need to be redrilled somewhat sooner than anticipated.,1' In
essence, Intel argued forcefully that access to water valued in the billions
of dollars both to Intel and to the community should not be denied.
In summary, Corrales' and Intel's public welfare arguments were
diametrically opposed. The State Engineer faced no easy decision.
3. The State Engineer's Decision
The State Engineer allowed that some domestic wells in the area
would need to be redrilled but said that all existing wells in the vicinity
of the Village of Corrales could be deepened to recover a reduced well
water column.' 3' He retained jurisdiction over Intel's permit to
evaluate, after three years of pumpage, the effects to existing shallow
wells in Corrales. 32
At the heart of the State Engineer's decision lies his refusal to
explicitly make the kinds of policy decisions involving public welfare. He
stated:
[diecisions as to the type of development, i.e. growth, that is
to occur in a given geographical area and effects resulting
from that growth on the economy and physical infrastructure
are best determined by appropriate governmental entities
through local zoning and land development authority.'
33
As a consequence, it appears that the State Engineer equated public
welfare with beneficial use. He held that "[tihe right to a new
appropriation or reallocation of water, if obtained pursuant to New
Mexico water law, is not against the public welfare." " He further
stated that
Neither New Mexico State Constitution nor New Mexico
Water Code do not [sic] provide a preference with respect to
the type of use to be made of New Mexico's limited water
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. at 8.
131. State Engineer Findings And Order, supra note 98, at 13.
132. Id. at 15.
133. Id. at 14.
134. Id.
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resources, provided that use of water is a beneficial use. A
statutorily recognized beneficial use of water is not against the
public welfare of the state.
131
Thus, lacking any specific guidance for his consideration and weighing
of public welfare criteria, the State Engineer ignored the legislature's
mandate to consider detriment to the public welfare separately from
beneficial use. This result is unfortunate and it clearly demonstrates the
need for a definition of public welfare. The potential economic benefit of
a project is no longer unquestioned as the guiding criterion of the
appropriation doctrine. The voices of environmental, recreational,
aesthetic and non-economic local interests are asserting themselves. The
U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico held that "'public
welfare' is a broad term including health and safety, recreational,
aesthetic, environmental and economic interests."" 3 Sleeper I powerfully
asserted local interests in conflict with economic development. Western
states, in permit statutes and case law, have widely acknowledged the
relevance of public values to public welfare review. New Mexico is one
of only a few western states that has not defined public welfare. Defining
public welfare would ensure that important public welfare values are
considered in new appropriations and water transfers. The question
which remains to be addressed is: who should define public welfare?
VII. WHAT IS THE BEST FORUM FOR DEFINING PUBLIC
WELFARE?
There are a number of solutions to the issue of defining public
welfare. Among them are: defining public welfare legislatively through
comprehensive lists of public welfare factors in permit statutes, or
through water use preference statutes; 37 defining public welfare at the
level of the Regional Water Planning process;!- requiring the equivalent
of an environmental impact statement (EIS) from applicants for
appropriations and transfers of water within the state which would
become part of the record from which the administrative decision-maker
makes his decision;'39 and defining public welfare through a
rulemaking proceeding by the State Engineer to adopt regulations
135. Id.
136. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984).
137. See Frank J. Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1967).
138. See DuMars & Minnis, supra note 95; see also Martha C. Franks, The Meaning of
"Public Welfare" in Water Law, 8 NEW MEXIcO NAT. RESOURcES L. REP. 1 (1993).
139. John Klein-Robbenhaar, Balancing Efficiency With Equity: Determining the Public
Welfare in Northern New Mexico Surface Water Transfers, 36 NAT. RESOURcES J. (1996).
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binding on the State Engineer."4  Each of these approaches has
advantages as well as disadvantages.
A. Definition by the Legislature
Statutory definition of public welfare criteria by the legislature
enjoys one major advantage over other approaches. The legislature is a
democratically elected body and therefore more representative of, and
accountable to, the public will than either the State Engineer or regional
water planning groups. Public welfare determinations are decisions about
the allocation of a scarce resource in such a way as to optimally achieve
society's goals. They are, therefore, social policy decisions. 4' W a t e r
codes which feature comprehensive lists of public welfare factors assure
at least that the state water officials must consider those public values.
Furthermore, they provide guidance to all permit applicants and
protestants as to which public welfare issues must be addressed. Yet lists
of potentially relevant factors provide no guidance on how to weigh all
the relevant factors.
One solution to this problem would be to prioritize welfare
criteria statutorily.42 Yet a system of priorities may be too static to
accommodate regional or temporal differences in water use. What is
appropriate and important to the public welfare in one region may be
irrelevant in another.' Thus, preference statutes could, at best, be a
guide to be disregarded when a region-specific or fact-specific situation
made other uses more in the public interest.'" Ultimately, detailed,
mechanical standards contradict the goals of optimal productivity from
existing water supplies and flexibility to take into consideration regional
and temporal differences.
The Shokal court suggested an interesting approach to the
problem. The court stated that: "what elements of the public interest are
impacted, and what the public interest requires, is committed to [the
140. See generally Bokum, supra note 32, at 19-28.
141. See generally DuMars & Minnis, supra note 95.
142. See Grant, supra note 1, at 709-10.
143. The Idaho Supreme Court in Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985),
characterized the problem as follows:
The relevant elements and their relative weights will vary with local needs,
circumstances, and interests. For example, in an area heavily dependent on
recreation and tourism or specifically devoted to preservation in its natural
state, Water Resources may give great consideration to the aesthetic and
environmental ramifications of granting a permit which calls for substantial
modification of the landscape or the stream. Id. at 450.
144. See Grant, supra note 1, at 710.
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Department of] Water Resources' sound discretion.""* However, the
court further held that the permit should not be granted if the project
were "contrary to the authority of the Board of Health in policing water
for pollution.""4 Thus, the Shokal court's approach to weighing public
interest factors, while flexible, has the effect of exempting certain public
welfare factors from the state water official's discretion by giving some
factors absolute priority.
B. Definition through the Regional Water Planning Process
The New Mexico's legislature has established a forum in which
public welfare could be determined. The legislature authorized the
Interstate Stream Commission to fund regional entities in developing
state water plans.'47 The process allows for involvement of citizens
affected by water usage, fair and adequate notice and full public
hearings." 8 Attaching the determination of public welfare to the
regional water planning process would allow local communities to make
fundamental choices about public welfare values in water use affecting
their region. 49 It would allow for local input into public welfare
determinations and for reflection of local economic conditions, values and
interests." Regional water plans could become a binding set of
regulations for purposes of determining public welfare impacts in a
region. 51
While the regional planning process has the advantage of
reflecting important regional concerns, adopting regional water plans as
binding regulations has serious legal as well as political flaws. First,
rulemaking power would be delegated to regional groups and the
Interstate Stream Commission. The legislature does not currently delegate
authority to these groups to adopt regulations. Thus, adoption of parts
of regional water plans as binding regulations would amount to an
unlawful delegation of power. 2 Second, it is likely that the regional
145. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 450.
146. Id. at 451.
147. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-14-1-72-14-42 (Michie 1978 & 1995 Supp.).
148. Id.
149. See DuMars & Minnis, supra note 95, at 837-38.
150. Id. at 838.
151. Id. The authors argue that ideally, water use priorities established through the
regional water planning process would reflect hydrologic and economic conditions of the
region as well as the distribution of public values regarding water characteristic of the
region. Once a regional plan had been produced, it could serve as a set of binding
regulations for purposes of determining public welfare for water decisions affecting the
region.
152. See Bokum, supra note 32, at 17.
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planning groups are composed in large part of major water users with
substantial self-interest in the outcome, and to a much smaller extent of
environmental interests and local entities such as ditch associations. "3
Thus, there is a substantial risk that the resulting regulations would not
fairly reflect local public interests."s
C. Requiring a "Public Welfare Impact Statement" s
Requiring the equivalent of an Environmental Impact Statement,
patterned on the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),M from
applicants for water transfers"7 would have the advantage of forcing
the applicant to discuss a wide range of public welfare values, rather than
allowing it to limit its discussion to economic benefits. Furthermore, it
would place an affirmative duty on the applicant to discuss public
welfare criteria.
On the other hand, requiring an impact statement from every
applicant for water transfer would not only prove too costly for many
applicants, but more importantly, it would have the same drawbacks as
the NEPA process. NEPA does not require commitment to any
substantive values, but is purely a procedural statute.ts Thus, an
applicant preparing an EIS must discuss all reasonable alternatives but
is under no obligation to make its substantive choice from among the
alternatives listed in the EIS. Similarly, an applicant for an appropriation
or transfer of water would be forced only to list and discuss a reasonable
range of public welfare factors. The balancing analysis from among
competing public welfare values would still be left to the State Engineer.
Thus, the requirement of a public welfare impact statement would not
necessarily be an improvement over the current process of making
welfare decisions on an ad hoc basis.
153. Id. at 18.
154. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 637 P.2d 38,
46 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) ("Dijn administrative law it is essential that an independent state
agency sit as a fair and impartial body at a hearing in which massive and important
regulations are to be adopted."), cited with approval by Bokum, supra note 32, at 18.
155. See generally Klein-Robbenhaar, supra note 139.
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(b) (1988). The requirements for an environmental impact
statement are found at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
157. See DuMars & Minnis, supra note 95, at 837; see also Klein-Robbenhaar, supra note
139.
158. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but
simply prescribes the necessary process.
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D. Adoption of Binding Regulations by the State Engineer
The State Engineer has statutory authority to "adopt regulations
and codes to implement and enforce any provision of any law
administered by him."'"' Adoption of regulations by the State Engineer
would promote predictability and provide procedural protections for
applicants to ensure that a wide range of public welfare factors is
considered."W The State Engineer is more qualified than the judges to
make water-related decisions and courts have been reluctant to interfere
with the lawfully delegated authority of administrative agencies.""
Furthermore, a major advantage of this approach would be that the
rulemaking process allows for public input from a wide range of
interests.1 2
There is legitimate concern, however, that an administrative
forum may not lend itself to the definition of public welfare. The State
Engineer may be ill prepared by training to deal with sweeping,
non-technical issues which are not clear-cut and capable of technical
resolution."'
E. The Preferred Solution: Legislative Definition of Public Welfare
The problem of how to weigh often conflicting public welfare
criteria defies easy solutions. The goal of providing optimal guidance to
state water officials and applicants conflicts with the twin goals of
flexibility to consider regional interests and optimal use of a scarce
resource. The best approach would be to define public welfare
legislatively. However, since the legislature has no specific expertise in
public welfare criteria, it should provide adequate opportunity for citizen
input before passing public welfare legislation.'" It should do so by
assembling a working group composed of members of various citizen
groups and water users and delegate to that group authority to draft
proposed public welfare legislation which would then be considered by
the legislature.
159. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-8 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1985).
160. See Bokum, supra note 32, at 21.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 28.
163. DuMars & Minnis, supra note 95, at 837-38.
164. The idea that citizen input should be involved in the legislature's process of
defining public welfare came from Consuelo Bokum. (telephone interview with Consuelo
Bokum, Mar. 28, 1995).
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The New Mexico legislature should further look to
comprehensive public welfare statutes like those of Alaska, North Dakota
or Oregon. Public welfare legislation should encompass a broad range of
public values." It should specifically direct the State Engineer to
consider local public interests in applications for appropriations and
transfers of water. Legislation might also direct the State Engineer to seek
guidance from regional water plans to determine the nature of local
needs and interests. In addition, the legislature should establish specific
minimum standards" by giving absolute priority to some public
welfare factors, such as water quality and conservation of water in the
state."17
While such legislation would still leave the balancing of public
welfare values to the State Engineer, it would provide him with clear
direction to consider a range of public welfare factors, including local
public interests, while limiting absolute discretion and preventing
arbitrary decision-making. Furthermore, it would give clarity and
guidance to all parties involved in applications for appropriations and
water transfers, thereby minimizing the number of appeals. Finally, it
would provide courts with clear standards by which to judge
administrative decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Public welfare has not been defined by the New Mexico
legislature and public welfare decisions are currently made in an ad hoc
fashion by the State Engineer or case by case by the courts. The State
Engineer, in his decision to grant Intel Corporation's application for an
appropriation of groundwater for the planned expansion of its Rio
Rancho, New Mexico facility, equated beneficial use with public welfare
165. The New Mexico Supreme Court, in analyzing the public welfare requirement,
stated that public welfare should be construed broadly. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110
P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910).
166. Douglas Grant argues that minimum standards will provide the additional benefit
of streamlining permit processes by weeding out certain applications at the very outset of
the process. Grant, supra note 1, at 710.
167. Conservation of water is already an important goal in New Mexico. The State
Engineer must consider conservation of water in applications for appropriations and transfer
of water.
Water quality, like conservation of water, is an important social goal which should be
made a part of public welfare considerations, Idaho, for example, requires that water quality
be made part of public welfare considerations. The Shokal court reasoned that although the
Department of Health was already primarily responsible for water quality, it would make
little sense for the Department of Water Resources to grant permit requests without regard
to water quality regulations. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 451 (Idaho 1985).
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and declined to make the kinds of policy decisions required in weighing
competing public welfare values. The preceding discussion has attempted
to demonstrate that there should be a framework within which public
welfare decisions are made. Water use preference statutes in which the
legislature defines public welfare are too rigid to accommodate local and
temporal differences in water use. Defining public welfare through the
regional water planning may give too much power to groups composed
in large part of major water users with a substantial self-interest in the
outcome. The legislature, as the forum best equipped to make social
policy decisions, should define public welfare. Legislation should provide
for broad consideration of public values and should mandate that the
administrative official consider local public interests in its public welfare
analysis. Finally, public welfare legislation should give absolute priority
to certain values such as water quality and conservation of water.
APPENDIX A: Public Welfare Factors which should be included in
Public Welfare Legislation
The following public welfare factors should be included in public welfare
legislation:
(1) The benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed
appropriation.
(2) The effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed
appropriation, including the effects on local communities and
traditional economies.
(3) The effect on fish and game resources.
(4) The effect on recreation and scenic beauty.
(5) The effect the proposed appropriation would have on other uses,
whether the proposed appropriation would result in loss of
alternative uses, and which of the uses would be the highest
desirable use.
(6) The intent and ability of the applicant to complete the
appropriation.
(7) The effect on public health.
(8) The effects on water quality.
(9) The effect on the goal of conservation of water.
(10) Local public interest as defined by regional land use planning
and zoning boards and public welfare as defined in regional
water plans.
Susanne Hoffman-Dooley
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